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This paper argues for an alternative methodology to estimate the value of risk to life. By 
relaxing the assumption of additive separability, we introduce risk aversion with respect to the 
length of life and show that the extended model better fits available data. This is crucial for 
the extrapolation stage that the evaluation of life-saving programs systematically requires. 
Current practice, we show, puts too little weight on the young. Our correction surpasses in 
magnitude that introduced by the switch from the notion of number of lives saved to the 
notion of years of life saved. 
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Billions of dollars are spent every year on mortality reduction programs. Issues like the
allocation of funds to medical research, the design of safety rules or environmental codes
raise intense debate on the relevance of the choices made by governments and their agencies.
For economists, the baseline is that alternative projects should be evaluated with objective
criteria to avoid pure waste and, above all, dramatic underinvestment in less popular issues.
To back public decisions, some inquiry into individual valuation of life is indispensable.
In practice, if we leave apart contingent valuation, the analysis of the wage-risk tradeoﬀ is
the major source of estimates of people behavior with respect to risk to life. This is infor-
mative basically about industry workers. Public programs touch wider population whose
characteristics may vary considerably and some extrapolation of the available data is neces-
sary. Whatever the extrapolation method retained, a structural lifecycle model is required
to introduce minimum bias at the estimation stage and then to reconstruct the missing data
with minimum error.
The standard life-cycle model assumes that individual preferences are separable additive.
Although this model has been severely criticized in other branches of literature (see for
example the literature on savings and references given in Subsection 2.1 below), it remains
an almost universal assumption for the applied economics literature on the value of life.
Nearly all mortality-related cost-beneﬁt analysis rely, explicitly or not, on this assumption.
The aim of the paper is to extend the theory to a broader class of models, to confront it to
the data, and to draw practical conclusions on the methods being currently recommended.
The generalization we develop consists in introducing risk aversion with respect to the
length of life. Although this extension increases the complexity of intermediate calculations,
we can derive results that are almost as simple as those obtained with the standard additive
model. This extension keeps therefore practical diﬃculties at a reasonable level. Moreover
our theoretical results provide simple insights on the potential bias induced by the additive
separability assumption.
We calibrate our model using the wage-risk tradeoﬀ recently reported in Aldy and Viscusi
2(2003, henceforth A&V). The data are hardly consistent with the additive model (unless one
assumes that the rate of time preference equals −8%) whereas the generalization proposed
provides a much improved ﬁt and more likely estimates.
In order to illustrate the practical interest of our study, we compare the beneﬁts of
diﬀerent (ﬁctitious) life saving policies under diﬀerent speciﬁcation choice. The magnitude
of the bias caused by the additive separability assumption appears to be uncomfortably big.
A practical conclusion is that the type of cost-beneﬁt analysis that is currently recommended
for life-saving programs is likely to be strongly biased in favor of the elderly.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 recalls the additive model and intro-
duces more general preferences. Section 3 shows the consequence of alternative models for
the individual and social valuations of statistical lives. Using an available hedonic regression
of the value of statistical life, Section 4 searches the best ﬁtting model and shows the per-
formance of the nonadditive version. Section 5 contrasts quantitatively several evaluation
procedures on typical life saving programs.
2 Lifetime preferences
2.1 The additive model
Most of the economics literature on the value of life is based on a particular model, whose
standard version (e.g. Shepard and Zeckhauser 1984 or Rosen 1988) relies on elements
developed in Yaari (1965). We refer to it thereafter as the “additive model”. According to
that model, preferences are additively separable, time consistent and independent of past








where sa(t) is the probability of being alive at age t conditional on being alive at age a, u is
the well-behaved instantaneous utility function and λ is the subjective discount factor.
3For discussing the tradeoﬀ between present and future consumption under death risk, it
will prove convenient to express the survival function sa(t) in terms of mortality rates, i.e.




where µ(τ) is the hazard rate of death at age τ. It will be assumed that µ(t) tends to inﬁnity
as t tends to inﬁnity. This is a purely technical assumption.
Additivity has been hardly discussed for the economic valuation of mortality changes,1
and the model keeps being used. A broader look at the literature shows intense criticism
on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Even with ﬁxed or absent mortality, theoretical
arguments underlined unpleasant consequences of the additive separability assumption (e.g.
Richard 1975, Deaton 1974 and 1992, Epstein and Zin 1991). Empirical studies repeatedly
showed the additive model’s inability to ﬁt intertemporal choice (Hayashi 1985, Muellbauer
1988, Browning 1991, and Carrasco, Labeaga and López-Salido 2002).
2.2 Generalization
The additive model is built upon three fundamental assumptions: time consistency, indepen-
dence to past history, additivity. There is no rush to be slack on individual rationality and
to introduce time inconsistencies, notwithstanding the fact that there is no solid foundation
to social choice theory in that case, a severe shortcoming for the analysis of public policy.
Rather than open the door for ad hoc assumptions (diﬀerent tastes, direct age dependency),
we maintain independence to the past and assume that agents have the same preferences
and vary only with respect to the constraints they face (age-related mortality, wealth). So,
we suggest to relax the less compelling assumption only, additivity.
Bommier (2003) showed that if preferences are time consistent and independent of past
histories, there are two functions u and v such that individuals of age a maximize a utility
1See Bommier (2001) and Bommier (2003).












In the particular case where v = λ = Constant, we retrieve the additive model: u is the
instantaneous utility and v is the (constant) pure rate of time preference.
However, as soon as we depart from the additive case, the meanings of u and v are not so
clear. Uzawa (1968) considered preferences with a similar structure and he interpreted the
integral
R t
a v(c(τ))dτ as an “accumulated rate of time of preference”. This extrapolation from
the additive model is misleading: it suggests that the rate of time discounting depends on past
consumption whereas preferences are characterized by independence with respect to it. A
preferable approach is to start from well deﬁned marginal properties of individual preferences
(MRS, elasticities of substitution) and to derive proper concepts of time discounting and
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This approach was initiated in Epstein (1987) in the
case of an inﬁnitely long lived agent, and pursued by Bommier (2003) for the preferences
considered in this paper.2
The ﬁrst concept we need is a rate of discount that tells how individuals trade between
present and future consumption:3















If sa(t) were constant (no mortality), this rate of time discounting would be nothing else
than the logarithmic derivative of a marginal rate of substitution. The factor 1
sa(t) corrects
the fact that mortality generates a risk on consumption.
2The paper oﬀers a more extensive discussion of the methodology that we only summarize here.
3Because of our continuous time modelling, we use Volterra derivatives. They measure utility changes
when consumption (or mortality) varies by an inﬁnitesimal value during an inﬁnitesimally short lapse of
time. For example ∂Ua
∂µ(t)dµdt gives the change in Ua when mortality rates increase by dµ during dt around
t.Aﬁrst application of Volterra derivatives to economics is Ryder and Heal (1973).











t v(c(τ1))dτ1)dτ . (5)
For the additive model (v = λ, a constant) the above formula simpliﬁes to RD = λ.
We measure how people compromise between survival probabilities at diﬀerent ages with
t h er a t eo fd i s c o u n tf o rl i f ey e a r s :












It is fairly simple to see that:
RDLY (c,t)=v(c(t)). (7)
It is remarkable that for additive preferences, RDLY (c,t)=RD(c,t)=λ so that there is a
possible confusion between the diﬀerent rates of discount above. It is clear, however, from
( 5 )a n d( 7 )t h a ti ng e n e r a lRDLY (c,t) and RD(c,t) are not equal. We shall show that the
diﬀerence captures an important economic eﬀect: risk aversion with respect to the length of
life.
This third concept simply measures the utility loss (or gain) when a life of a given length
is replaced with a inﬁnitesimal lottery over life duration. See Bommier (2003) for a formal
deﬁnition and the economic interpretation of this particular index of risk aversion. We only
recall here its expression when preferences have the form speciﬁed in (3).





6In the additive case, v0 =0and RAL =0:the individual is risk neutral with respect to
the length of life.
Among the utility functions (3), a few forms are characterized by convenient properties.
We already mentioned the additive model (obtained when v constant). Another one is the
multiplicative model, where v = βu with β a constant. This model illustrates the role of risk
aversion with respect to the length of life as an alternative to the familiar notion pure time
preference: according to the multiplicative model, individuals have no pure time preferences
and time discounting is exclusively driven by the combination of mortality and risk aversion
with respect to the length of life (Bommier 2003). Since this model is a serious alternative
to the additive one, we shall mention its implications along the paper.
3 The impact of structural assumptions
T h es e a r c hf o rt h eb e s tp u b l i cp r o g r a m sr e q u i r e st h ec a l c u l a t i o no fb a s i ci n d i c e sl i k et h ev a l u e
of a statistical life (VSL) or the welfare equivalent of a statistical like (WE). To evaluate
counterfactual eﬀects on mortality, the choice of the structural model is critical. We show
in the following subsection the systematic bias that the additive model introduces.
3.1 The individual value of a statistical life
A natural concept to deal with choices involving mortality changes is the opposite of the
marginal rate of substitution between mortality and consumption:







By deﬁnition, VSL(c,t) · dµ · dt is the willingness to pay of an agent of age t to reduce
his mortality rate from µ(τ) to µ(τ) − dµ between age t and t + dt. In other words, an
agent of age is ready to give up VSL(c,t)·dµ·dt consumption to save dµ·dt statistical lives.
7From there comes our use of the terminology “Value of Statistical Life”, although it may
diﬀer from other deﬁnitions of the VSL that can be found in the economic literature.4 By





with Ut deﬁn e da si n( 3 ) .
When the consumption proﬁle is constant, a fairly simple expression relates VSL to
survival probabilities and discount rates.




















The result for the additive case has been known for years. It is considered as very convenient
since, if we abstract from consumption variations, VSL is proportional to a discounted sum
of life years. The relation between age and VSL is simply computed from a standard life
table and a discount rate. This way to account for age heterogeneity in VSL was initially
introduced by Moore and Viscusi (1988) and is now used and recommended by agencies like
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Oﬃce of Management and Budget
(OMB) for cost-beneﬁts analyses.
4As discussed in Johansson (2002), various deﬁnitions of VSL have been suggested, depending on the
modelling (continuous, discrete, etc.). Our deﬁnition is consistent with Johansson’s (2002). The reader can
just remember that in this paper, VSL is only a MRS (a well deﬁned economic concept) between mortality
risk and consumption.
8The simplicity of the formula is an attractive feature of the additive model. Proposition
1 shows that the extension we suggest is only associated with a minor increase in complexity.
Although the generalization makes intermediate calculations more fastidious, we eventually
ﬁnd that the beneﬁt of saving the life of an individual of a given age is also proportional to
the discounted sum of years saved.
There are however two diﬀerences between equations (11) and (12). First, in the general
model the mortality adjusted rate of discount is not constant. Instead of using a discount
function given by e−λ(τ−t), as in the additive case, we have to use e(−
R τ
t RD(c,τ1)dτ1).A c t u a l l y ,
when we calibrate the model, we ﬁnd that the variations in the rate of discount remain
limited until advanced ages, so this ﬁrst diﬀerence can be considered as minor. The second
diﬀerence is much more important. Equation (11) requires a discount factor e
v0u
u0 (τ−t) which
does not appear in the additive case since v0 =0 .R e m e m b e rt h a tv0u
u0 is nothing else that the
risk aversion with respect to the length of life. Therefore, years of life have to be discounted
with the mortality adjusted rate of discount (the ﬁrst discount function) minus risk aversion
with respect to the length of life (second discount function). In particular, the greater risk
aversion with respect to the length of life, the faster VSL declines as a function of age. The
additive model, which assumes away risk aversion with respect to the length of life, may
underestimate the speed at which VSL declines with age.
Our results are fairly intuitive. A risk averse agent is willing to pay more to avoid the
chance of a major loss. In terms of mortality, a loss would be an early death and the concept
of risk aversion with respect to the length of life is pertinent. The additive model neglects this
eﬀects and the magnitude of the bias clearly depends on the value of RAL. The calibration
in Section 4 estimates the bias.
3.2 The welfare equivalent of a statistical life
To compare the “weights” given to mortality reduction at diﬀerent ages in social welfare,
it is useful to give a simple expression of the derivative of individual utility with respect to
instantaneous mortality rate. We follow Arthur’s (1981) terminology.





WE has a fairly simple expression.







0 RDLY (c,τ1)dτ. (14)
Proof. See appendix.
The welfare equivalent is a discounted sum of life years. The rate of discount to be
used is the rate of discount with respect to life years (RDLY ). In the additive model,
RDLY = RD, thus it is correct to use the discount rate inferred from empirical studies on
consumption smoothing to estimate the welfare equivalent of a statistical life. In the more
general case, RDLY 6= RD and when consumption is constant and mortality increases with
age, the diﬀerence between RDLY and RD has the same sign as v0. In other words, when
risk aversion with respect to the length of life is considered, the rate of discount to be used is
greater than the discount rate estimated in studies on consumption smoothing (RD). Thus,
omission of the risk aversion with respect to the length of life generates a pro-old bias in
the welfare evaluation of mortality risk reduction. The illustrative examples developed in
Section 5 provides insights on the size of the bias.
4D a t a ﬁtting
In order to evaluate the power of the extension we propose, we calibrate the model to ﬁt
the empirical estimates of VSL reported in A&V. To do so, a ﬁrst step shows the relation-
ship between empirical VSL and the model above (Subsection 4.1), then, through distance
minimization, we ﬁnd the structural parameters that ﬁt empirical VSL (Subsection 4.2).
104.1 Wage-risk tradeoﬀ
Assume that, at all ages, an individual has to choose between jobs that diﬀer with respect
to wages and instantaneous fatality risk. Let µ0(t) be the exogenous baseline mortality rate
at age t. For an extra instantaneous mortality µ(t) (total mortality µ0(t)+µ(t)), the wage
is denoted by w(t,µ(t)). Labor income can be used for consumption or savings. We denote
by c(t) the consumption at age t and by
k(t)=w(t,µ(t)) − c(t), (15)
the saving ﬂow at age t. For our purpose, we do not need to fully specify the lifetime
budget constraints that are related to the intertemporal markets and their possible imper-
fections. We shall simply assume that these constraints (possibly inﬁnitely many) only bear
on function k(·). We denote this set of constraints by K(k).
We may think of diﬀerent kinds of constraints. With non storable commodities and no
intertemporal markets, k(t)=0for all t. Another possibility would be a single constraint of
the form
R ∞
0 h(t)e−rtk(t)dt =0with r the rate of interest and h(t) an exogenous function.
This includes the case of perfect intertemporal markets (including life annuities). We could
also imagine that the constraints K(k) have the form
R t
0 e−rτk(τ)dτ ≥ 0 for all t.T h a t
would be the case in a world where there is no annuity market, no borrowing and a rate
of return on savings equal to r. More complex market imperfections can be thought of.
Undoubtedly, allowing any kind of constraints on k leaves us with a fairly high degree of
generality, although certain cases are not covered, like a nonlinear consumption tax.

















k(t)=w(t,µ(t)) − c(t) for all t,
K(k).
(17)
Let c∗ and µ∗ denote the optimal consumption and mortality paths. We relate the
derivative wµ = ∂w
∂µ at the optimum to the parameter of the utility function and to c∗ and
µ∗. Following the terminology of A&V, we call wµ the “wage-risk tradeoﬀ.”
Determination of VSL at the optimal choice can be done without having an explicit









As we assumed that all constraints can be written as functions of k, the ﬁrst order conditions


















The observation of the wage-risk tradeoﬀ reveals the preferences and makes the calibration
of the utility function possible. The strength of the result is that this possibility does not
depend on the existence of complete markets. The following explains how we proceed in
practice.
4.2 Fitting the data
As explained in Viscusi and Aldy (2003), the hedonic regression ﬁts the envelope of the
choices made by the workers in the sample. Since the tangents of the individual indiﬀerence
curve and of the envelope are the same, estimates provided by hedonic regressions can be
interpreted as the VSL for the corresponding worker.
12that are considered as reasonable), we would at best explain 58% of the age-related variance.
The general model, which introduces risk aversion with respect to the length of life, is
more ﬂexible. Nevertheless, we have to check that it ﬁts (21) without assuming implausible




1−γ and v = λ + βu. This speciﬁ-
cation covers both the additive model (β =0 ) and the multiplicative one (λ =0 ) evoked in
Subsection 2.2. In Figure 2, we report the minimum distance between the theoretical pre-
dictions and the empirical estimates, the survival weighted average RD being constrained to
take particular values given on the horizontal axis. The results obtained with the additive
and the multiplicative models are also reported. The distance on the vertical axis has been
normalized so that the distance between the empirical VSL and its mean equals 1.
Unsurprisingly, the general model always provides a better ﬁt. Even if we constrain
the mortality adjusted rate of discount to take reasonable positive values we still obtain an
excellent ﬁt. If we constrain the survival weighted average RD t ol i eb e t w e e n3a n d7% ,w e
are able to explain more than 95% of age-related variability of the wage-risk tradeoﬀ.T h a ti s
much better than the additive model which only explains from 42 to 58 % of the age-related
variability. Table 1 reports the model’s performance (variance explained and parameters)
for a range of discount factors. Figure 3 illustrates the ﬁts obtained in the case where the
average mortality adjusted rate of discount is constrained to equal 3%.
Model: Additive Non additive Multiplicative
RD Average RD Average RD
3% 5% 7% 3% 5% 7% 3% 5% 7%
Variance explained 58% 49% 46% 96% 96% 95% 95% 96% 89%
b γ 0.22 0.0∗ 0.0∗ 4.15 3.25 2.65 3.70 3.77 3.56
b β 3% 5% 7% 00 .01% 0.1% 00 0
Average RAL 000 8.9% 9.6% 10.7% 8.3% 10.4% 12.0%
Average RDLY 3% 5% 7% 8.3% 9.3% 10.5% 7.9% 9.7% 11.1%
*The elasticity of substitution is constrained to be non-negative.
Table 1: Calibration and performance.
































Empirical estimates from Lee and Tuljapurkar
Smoothed profile used in the paper











































































































Empirical estimates from Aldy and Viscusi
Additive model, with RD=0.03
General model with average RD=0.03
Figure 3: Age dependent value of a statistical lifeutility of consumption, and therefore very low values of statistical lives. This is hard to buy.
To circumvent this diﬃculty, we maintain the assumption that preferences are independent
of age and artiﬁcially assume that for children, consumption is the same as at 20. Of course
this option is arbitrary, one of its merit is that most of the diﬀerence between A and B is
based on eﬀects on the adults, for which estimates are more reliable.
Intuitively, it is not very clear whether A or B should be preferred. On the one hand A
saves more lives. On the other hand B saves younger people, who still have many years of
life. We compare the conclusion that we would draw from ﬁve types of beneﬁt evaluation.
Method 1: The number of lives saved. T h o u g ht h e r ei sn oe c o n o m i cs u p p o r tf o rt h i s
method, it has been frequently used in the past. EPA and OMB still recommends to report
the number of lives saved.
Method 2: Utilitarianism with the additive utility function. It assumes that all
agents have the same additive utility function, with a rate of time preference of 3, 5 and 7%,
the other parameters being drawn from estimates of Subsection 4.2. It also assumes that
the government has a utilitarian social welfare function and that social and individual rates
of discount are equal.
Method 2’: Aggregate WTP with additive utility function. The beneﬁts of a pro-
gram is evaluated by the sum of the individual willingness to pay for such a program. In-
dividual willingness to pay are estimated under the assumption that individual preferences
are separable additive with the parameters estimated in Subsection 4.2.
Method 2’ amounts to method 2 if one assumes that the marginal social value of con-
sumption is identical across people of diﬀerent ages, in other words, redistribution is either
perfect or neglected.
Redistribution being in general far from perfect, many papers argue that aggregate will-
ingness to pay cannot be considered as a relevant policy indicator. The issue is not speciﬁc
to saving live programs but general to any cost beneﬁt analysis (see for example the dis-
17Actually, the combination of parameters that optimally ﬁt the data is diﬃcult to say.
Though the model is statistically identiﬁable, the regression is not reliable numerically. This
is not surprising since we know from equation (11) that, at least when consumption is
constant, what matters for determining the variations of wµ along the life cycle is the combi-
nation of two elements: the mortality adjusted rate of discount minus the risk aversion with
respect to the length of life. The diﬀerence between the two is correctly estimated, which
suﬃces for a better performance than that of the additive model, but the estimate of each
component is unstable. Ultimately, to discriminate more sharply between the several likely
possibilities, we should integrate data on behaviors that go beyond the wage-risk tradeoﬀ.
A possibility would be to look at consumption smoothing behavior, but we leave that aside
for lack of adequate data. Results thereafter are systematically reported for the values of 3,
5a n d7 % .
Interestingly enough, one can see, from Table 1 or Figure 2, that when RD is constrained
to plausible positive values, the multiplicative model does a better job than the additive one,
although it has the same number of degrees of freedom. Therefore even if one is reluctant
to increase the complexity of the model, an eﬃciency gain can be obtained by passing from
the additive model to the multiplicative model.
F r o mt h el a s tt w or o w so fT a b l e1 ,i ti sp o s s i b l et oh a v eaﬁrst idea on the potential
bias generated by the additive assumption. While the additive model constrains the risk
aversion with respect to the length of life to be null, our estimates with the general model
gives estimates that range from 8.9% to 10.7%. In other words, when people discount
consumption with rates of 3, 5 and 7%, life years in VSL should be discounted with rates
of −5.9%, −4.6% or −3.7% respectively. Needless to say that the additive model, which
imposes the same rate of discount for consumption and life years, is likely to cause a huge
bias.
Should that lead to a major shift in policy recommendations? A ﬁrst answer comes from
the estimates of RDLY that, we know from Proposition 2, is the rate of discount to be used
for estimating the welfare equivalent of a statistical life. While the additive model constrains
15RDLY to equal the rate of discount, the estimates we obtain with the more general model
show values of RDLY that exceed those of RD by several percentage points. This means,
that the additive model puts to much relative weight on the old. The following section
illustrates the magnitude of the shift.
5 Application to program comparison
To show the magnitude of the distortion in the evaluation of safety programs, we consider two
alternative scenarios. One decreases mortality rates proportionally. Control of air quality
can be seen as an intervention of this kind (Pope et al. 1995 make this assumption). For
the same cost, the other decreases mortality rates uniformly. That might be the case of a
regulation that limits human fatalities in case of an earthquake.
We denote these hypothetical interventions as A and B. Policy A is characterized by a
reduction of mortality rates
µ(t) → (1 − εA)µ(t), (22)
and policy B by a reduction of mortality rates
µ(t) → µ(t) − εB. (23)
where εA and εB a r ep o s i t i v ec o n s t a n t .W et a k et h ea g es t r u c t u r eo ft h ep o p u l a t i o na n dt h e
baseline mortality rates observed in the USA in 1999. We shall also assume that A saves
twice as many (statistical) lives than B. Policy A is mostly eﬀective for the older people (and
babies) while policy B saves lives with a uniform rate. Figure 4 shows the age distribution
of lives saved (it has been scaled so that A saves 2000 statistical lives while B saves only
1000). We assume that the consumption proﬁle is c∗ (see Subsection 4.2), for ages above
20. For ages below 20, and especially for babies and young children, the assumption that
preferences are independent of age becomes problematic. The low levels of consumption
that are typically observed in the very ﬁrst years of life would then imply very high marginal
16cussion in Blackorby and Donaldson 1990). In the case of mortality reduction, Pratt and
Zeckhauser (1996) stressed that because of the strong heterogeneity in mortality rates, ag-
gregating individual willingness to pay may actually be a particularly misleading indicator.
Nevertheless, perhaps for lack of convincing alternatives, method 2’ indisputably remains
the most commonly used in the applied literature.
Method 3: Utilitarianism with the general utility function. Similar to method 2,
with the diﬀerence that we take a general utility function as estimated in Subsection 4.2.
Again we constrain the average survival weighted RD and the social rate of discount to equal,
i nt u r n ,3 ,5a n d7 % .
Method 3’: Aggregate WTP with the general utility function. Similar to method
2’, with the general utility function as estimated in Subsection 4.2. Method 3’ suﬀers the
same theoretical drawback as method 2’.
The results are synthesized in Table 2. By assumption, A is twice as eﬃcient as B
from the viewpoint of method 1. The additive model provides an age-adjusted value of a
statistical life, thus methods 2 and 2’ lead to diﬀerent conclusions. Actually, when we use the
parameters estimated in section 4, methods 2 and 2’ predict that the beneﬁts of A and B are
of about the same size. The fact that B saves less lives than A is approximately compensated
b yt h ef a c tt h a ti ts a v e sy o u n g e rp e o p l e .T h eq u e s t i o ni sw h e t h e rt h i sa g ea d j u s t m e n ta n d
this conclusion are indeed correct. The results of methods 3 and 3’ suggest that it is not the
case. When using the more general model the beneﬁts of B appear to be much greater than
those of A. The correction related to the introduction of risk aversion with respect to the
length of life is anything but negligible. Actually, passing from the additive model to the
nonadditive one is a bigger step than passing from the traditional method (number of lives
saved) to those based on the additive model.6
6We could also deﬁne two additional methods that parallel methods 2 and 2’ but make use of the mul-
tiplicative model. However, as it happens that the general model estimated in Subsection 4.2 is practically






























































Figure 4: Distribution of lives saved

























Method for beneﬁt evaluation 3% 5% 7%
1 (Number of lives saved) 0.50 .50 .5
2 (Utilitarianism with additive utility function) 1.11 0.97 0.88
3 (Utilitarianism with general utility function) 3.23 2.64 2.18
2’ (Aggregate WTP with additive utility function) 0.94 0.82 0.75
3’ (Aggregate WTP with general utility function) 1.95 1.75 1.72
Table 2: Beneﬁts of B/Beneﬁts of A.
EPA guidelines advise to perform sensitivity analysis by calculating the results of both
methods 1 and 2. As the results of method 2 are known to depend on the rate of discount,
about which there is no general agreement, they advise to report the results for diﬀerent
rates lying in the 3-7 % interval, in order to provide a reasonable conﬁdence interval. Un-
fortunately, the additive model is so restrictive that the truth may be way out this interval.
The methods currently used by EPA and OMB (and indirectly by policymakers) are likely
to be signiﬁcantly distorted in favor of the old.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Most economists would agree that predicting saving behavior under the assumption of risk
neutrality would make little sense. They would also vehemently criticize a fund manager
that decides to “optimize” investment under the assumption that members are risk neutral.
The economic literature on the value of a statistical life has however endorsed a similar
embarrassing choice. Mortality makes our life akin to an extraordinary lottery. Bad luck
and we die young, good luck and we spend hours playing with our grand children. Is it
reasonable to assume that individuals are risk neutral with respect to the length of life? And
to evaluate life saving programs under this assumption?
These questions have been addressed in this paper. On the theoretical side, the story
is rather clear. Risk aversion with respect to the length of life makes individual willingness
19to pay for mortality risk reduction decline more rapidly with age. Actually, although in-
termediate calculations are sometimes fastidious, we eventually found that accounting for
risk aversion with respect to the length of life is fairly simple. Just like with the standard
additive model, one simply has to use appropriate rates of discount accounting both for time
preferences and for risk aversion with respect to the length of life.
The key issue is therefore to estimate the coeﬃcient of risk aversion with respect to length
of life. The diﬃculty of the task should not be underestimated. Since Arrow’s and Pratt’s
seminal articles, about 40 years have passed and a number of empirical studies tried to
measure the standard Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion. Surveys and experiments
have even been designed for that purpose. Still, our knowledge of the magnitude of individual
risk aversion is limited. Individual preferences with respect to lotteries on wealth remain
the object of intense investigations. There is no reason to believe that individual preferences
with respect to lotteries on the length of life will be easier to assess. It would be excessively
optimistic to expect that a single study provides a robust estimate of risk aversion with
respect to the length of life. Rather this should be seen as a long term objective that will
probably require the collection of speciﬁc data.
However, in order to ﬁx ideas, we used results from a recent empirical study on the
relation between VSL and age to estimates plausible values of risk aversion with respect to
the length of life. The theoretical extension neatly improved the quality of ﬁt. Actually we
found that the index of risk aversion with respect to the length of life is likely to be positive
and greater than the rate of time discounting. In other words, accounting for risk aversion
with respect to the length of life may even be more important than accounting for time
preferences.
The contrast between our ﬁndings and the dominant economic approach is striking. While
the notion of time preferences has been pointed out as being a major element to estimate the
value of a statistical life, the standard method simply rules out the existence of risk aversion
with respect to the length of life although it plays a more important role. It seems that
“the paradigm of optimizing a simple functional form” (to take Rubinstein’s 2003 words)
20Using a hedonic regression, A&V report several estimates of the VSL and of it variations
with age. We use the parameters they give in their Table 4
w
AV
µ (t)=−1.92 × 10
7 +1 .88 × 10
6t − 4.54 × 10
4t
2 +3 3 5 .24 t
3 (21)
for t ∈ [20,60].
The calibration strategy we pursue consists in estimating preference parameters that ﬁt
best equation (21). We only discuss what would be the most likely parameters, if the equation
was actually exact. This is consistent with the objective of the paper: showing that the
additive model biases substantially the econometric valuation of longevity gains. Actually,
A&V stress that hedonic regressions exhibit uncertainty on the estimated parameters. One
should therefore be cautious that equation (21) gives the most likely relation between age
and VSL that emerges from the data that A&V had in hands, but it should not be considered
as reporting an indisputablet r u t h . B yt h es a m et o k e n ,w ec a n n o ta r g u et h a tw ep r o v i d e
robust estimates of the true preferences parameters.
In order to calibrate the model, we also need the age-speciﬁc consumption proﬁle c∗,
which is not available in the dataset used by A&V. The optimal consumption proﬁle cannot
be deduced from the theoretical model without speciﬁcation of the constraints K(k) on
which we have limited knowledge. Rather than posing speciﬁc constraints, we assumed that
c∗ corresponds with a smoothed version of the age speciﬁc individual consumption proﬁle
reported in Lee and Tuljapurkar (1997) (see Figure 1 for the original estimates and the
smoothed proﬁle that we use).5
The ﬁrst question that we may address is whether we can reproduce the relation (21) with




1−γ for some γ ≥ 0).
The answer is yes, but with very implausible parameters. Indeed the distance minimizing
discount rate is −8.1%, which explains 94% of the age-related variance in equation (21). Had
we constrained the rate of discount to be greater than or equal to 3% (to approach values
5Lee and Tuljapurkar (1997) is one the few recent studies that provide individual (and not household)
age-speciﬁc consumption proﬁles.
13lead economists to ignore a key ingredient of individual preferences. The consequence is
that cost-beneﬁt analysis produced for the allocation of public money across saving lives
programs is likely to be strongly distorted.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Since we only consider constant consumption proﬁles, dependency on consumption is not
detailed (e.g. u0(c(t)) will be simply written u0).We will also note κ = v0u
u0 the coeﬃcient of
risk aversion with respect to the length of life. Equation (5) rewrites
RD(c,t)=
































The result that we aim at proving is that VSL(c,t)=G(c,t).
First, let us show that VSL → 0 and G → 0 as t →∞ . By assumption, the mortality rate
is going to inﬁnity. Thus the discounted expected length of life
R +∞
t st(τ)e−v(τ−t)dτ tends to
zero as t tends to inﬁnity. This implies that VSL → 0 as t →∞ .T h i sa l s oi m p l i e st h a t ,f o r
t large enough, κ
R +∞
t st(τ)e−v(τ−t)dτ < 1/2. Combined with (24), it provides a lower bound
on RD.N a m e l yRD > −2|v − κ|. Consequently, µ(t)+RD(c,t)−κ →∞as t →∞ . Given














we also conclude that G → 0 as t →∞ . The functions VSL and G have therefore the same
limit when t →∞ .
Second, we show that they are solutions of the same diﬀerential equation. Using the fact
that d
dtst(τ)=µ(t)st(τ), derivation of (26) gives
∂G(c,t)
∂t
=[ µ(t)+RD(c,t) − κ]G(c,t) −
u
u0. (28)
Now denote I =
R +∞
t st(τ)e−v(τ−t)dτ and remark that
dI
dt
























1−κI , we have v(t)=( 1−κI)RD(c,t)+κ−µ(t)κI, which plugged


































VSL(c,t)=( µ(t)+RD(c,t) − κ)VSL (c,t) −
u
u0. (33)
This linear ﬁrst order diﬀerential equation being the same as (28) we obtain that G−VSL
is solution to the diﬀerential equation
y
0 =( µ(t)+RD(c,t) − κ)y. (34)
Now remember that µ(t)+RD(c,t)−κ goes to inﬁnity as t →∞ . Thus any non null solution
of (34) diverges at ∞.S i n c e w e k n o w t h a t (G−VSL) → 0 as t →∞ , it is necessarily the
case that G =VSL.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
From (2), it follows that
∂sa(τ)
∂µ(t)
=0 if τ<t , (35)
∂sa(τ)
∂µ(t)
= −s(τ) if τ ≥ t. (36)
25Derivating (3) then gives (14).
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